随着上周末首场线上轮的顺利开战，2026秋季挑战步入正轨，接下来将紧锣密鼓地多场次展开，大家加油！
上一期我们讨论了“灵活性是否意味着自由”，从零工是否真的能拥有更多自主权的角度，用正反两方的视角带大家更深入了解辩题。
今天我们继续为大家更新第二期辩题锦囊《谁在为我们的便利买单》，一起来看看城市即时服务的背后，藏着哪些不为人知的代价。
#1 城市即时服务背后的隐形劳动账单
A thumb taps a screen and dinner arrives in thirty minutes. Another tap and a car is at the curb. Cities have trained this into weather. The gig economy’s real product is not noodles or a back seat. It is other people’s time, risk, and bodies, sold as cheap immediacy. The useful question is who signs the invoice that never appears in the app.
手指轻点屏幕，晚餐便在三十分钟内送达；再点一下，车已候在路边。在城市里，我们早已习惯这一切，就像习惯了每天的天气。零工经济真正提供的产品，不是一碗面，也不是一次乘车服务。它把他人的时间、承受的风险和身体的消耗，包装成廉价的即时便利。真正值得追问的是：那张从不出现在应用程序里的账单，究竟由谁买单？
The ILO counted digital labor platforms rising from about 193 in 2010 to about 1,070 in 2023 (334 delivery, 119 ride-hail). The World Bank puts online gig work at 4.4–12.5 percent of the global labor force. China has turned the trend into infrastructure: 13–15.9 million food-delivery riders; 3.363 million Meituan riders earning in an average 2024 month (+16%), with 7.0–7.45 million often cited as active; Ele.me at 3–4 million; about 7.48 million ride-hail drivers. In 2023 the ACFTU put truckers, drivers, couriers, and delivery workers at 84 million. At that scale, “flexibility” is a system that reallocates risk.
据国际劳工组织（ILO）统计，数字劳动平台从2010年的约193家增至2023年的约1,070家，其中配送平台334家，网约车平台119家。世界银行估计，线上零工劳动者占全球劳动力的4.4%—12.5%。在中国，这股趋势已成为基础设施的一部分：外卖骑手有1,300万—1,590万人；2024年，美团平均每月有336.3万名骑手获得收入，增长16%，而常被引用的“活跃骑手”人数为700万—745万；饿了么骑手约300万—400万人；网约车司机约748万人。中华全国总工会（ACFTU）在2023年估计，货车司机、网约车司机、快递员和外卖配送员等群体共有8,400万人。达到这样的规模，“灵活性”就已是一套重新分配风险的制度。
#2 有控制，无责任
Platforms assign orders, set clocks, suggest routes, take commissions, rate workers, and deactivate accounts, while classifying most people as contractors. Social insurance, hour caps, injury cover, and a wage floor become the rider’s own accident policy, hospital bill, ticket, and vehicle depreciation—cost-shifting, in the research jargon. Renwu’s 2020 investigation “Delivery Riders, Stuck in the System” showed windows shrinking toward the fastest time anyone posted: eight minutes today becomes the new ten. Sun Ping called the riders’ reply an “inverse algorithm”: after months inside a machine that pays only for speed, running lights is how one remains employable. Shanghai police recorded, in 2017 H1, roughly one rider injury or death every 2.5 days. Chengdu, in the first seven months of 2018, logged nearly 10,000 rider violations, 196 crashes, and 155 casualties. Compilations put delivery-related crashes above 12,000 in 2023. Batched dispatch stacks several orders—sometimes more than ten—on one rider within minutes. A 2025 diary study of 117 couriers and 1,430 workdays found that only on days of tight surveillance did safety concern reliably slow the scooter. Safety is a luxury that must beat that day’s rent.
平台派发订单、设定时限、推荐路线、抽取佣金、给劳动者评分，还能停用他们的账号，却将大多数人归为独立承包者。本应由制度兜底的社会保险、工时上限、职业伤害保障和最低工资，最终变成了骑手自行购买的意外险、自付的医疗费、交通罚单和车辆折旧——用研究者的话说，就是“成本转嫁”。《人物》2020年的调查报道《困在系统里的外卖骑手》揭示，配送时限不断向曾经有人跑出的最快纪录收紧：今天有人八分钟送达，明天八分钟就会取代十分钟，成为新的标准。孙萍将骑手对此的应对称为“逆算法”：在一套只认速度的系统里工作数月之后，闯红灯竟成了保住饭碗的办法。上海警方2017年上半年的记录显示，平均每2.5天就有约一名骑手受伤或死亡。2018年前七个月，成都记录了近一万起骑手交通违法行为、196起交通事故，以及155人伤亡。汇总资料显示，2023年与外卖配送有关的交通事故超过1.2万起。批量派单会在几分钟内把多笔订单——有时超过十笔——压到同一名骑手身上。一项2025年的研究追踪了117名配送员、共1,430个工作日，发现只有在受到严密监控的日子里，骑手对安全的顾虑才会稳定地转化为减速行为。安全成了一种奢侈，只有当它压过当天的房租压力时，才有被优先考虑的余地。
#3 法案是什么样的？
After Renwu, the family of an Ele.me rider killed at work was first offered about 2,000 yuan; the sum rose once the internet noticed. In January 2021 an Ele.me rider in Zhejiang set himself on fire over roughly 5,000 yuan in withheld pay. September 2024 repeated the formula. Li Guocai, 42, died in a Qingpu rented room; The Paper reported a three-yuan accident policy running only from his first order of the day to his last. Dying after the app went quiet missed the “working hours” window. Five days later Yuan, 55, died on his scooter in Hangzhou. Colleagues said he split dawn, lunch, dinner, and midnight—often past sixteen hours—to pay school fees. He had broken a leg a month earlier and been back about two weeks. Crowdsourced status, multi-apping to dodge fatigue prompts, per-order insurance, a death in a crack the system does not call work.
《人物》报道刊出后，一名因工死亡的饿了么骑手，其家属最初得到的赔偿方案仅约2,000元；直到事件引发网络关注，金额才有所提高。2021年1月，浙江一名饿了么骑手因约5,000元报酬被扣发而自焚。2024年9月，同样的悲剧再次上演。42岁的李国才死于青浦区的一间出租屋；澎湃新闻报道，他购买的三元意外险，仅覆盖当天接下第一单到完成最后一单之间的时段。人是在接单软件归于沉寂后去世的，因而不在“工作时间”的保障窗口内。五天后，55岁的袁某在杭州死于自己的电动车上。同事说，为了给孩子交学费，他从清晨跑到午餐高峰、晚餐高峰，直至午夜，常常一天工作超过十六小时。他一个月前腿部骨折，复工也才约两周。众包身份、为躲避疲劳提示而在多个平台间接单、按单投保的保险——而死亡，却发生在系统不承认属于“工作”的缝隙里。
A 2025 Frontiers in Public Health survey of 1,092 riders in Beijing, Shanghai, and Jinan found about 39 orders and 10 hours a day; nearly half reported work-related illness. In Guangzhou the median week was 63 hours. In a 146-rider study, 95 percent had been injured at least once. Across 1,200 couriers and 580,000 orders in 2024, China’s hottest year on record, heatwaves raised hourly orders ~9 percent and hours ~6 percent, while hourly pay rose by about one yuan; heat-illness costs averaged more than 500 yuan at the summer peak. Customers ordered more because the street was dangerous. Riders stayed because the orders were there. Ride-hailing is the other column: employee pension and medical coverage about 10.5 percent among drivers, against 41.2 percent in construction and 32.2 percent among truckers.
《公共卫生前沿》（Frontiers in Public Health）2025年一项针对北京、上海和济南1,092名骑手的调查发现，骑手平均每天送约39单、工作约10小时；近半数受访者报告患有与工作有关的疾病。广州骑手每周工作时长的中位数为63小时。在一项涉及146名骑手的研究中，95%的人至少受过一次伤。2024年是中国有气象记录以来最热的一年。一项覆盖1,200名配送员、58万笔订单的研究发现，热浪期间，每小时订单量上升约9%，工作时长增加约6%，但每小时报酬仅增加约1元；盛夏高温最严重时，高温所致疾病的相关费用平均超过500元。顾客多点外卖，是因为出门有危险；骑手继续奔波，是因为有单可接。这张账单的另一栏是网约车司机：他们的职工养老保险和职工医疗保险覆盖率约为10.5%，而建筑业劳动者为41.2%，货车司机为32.2%。
#4 没有保障的薪水
Meituan reported high-frequency monthly pay of 6,650–9,344 yuan in 2024 and 6,949–10,201 yuan in 2025 H1. About 80 percent of its riders come from counties; more than nine in ten are migrants aged 18–44. That pay is rent and tuition—bought with near-full-time hours. Only about 11 percent previously hit the 260-day count that unlocked advertised insurance, against millions who logged on at least once. A 2022 Wuhan University survey found ~80 percent of couriers without pension cover and ~79 percent without medical cover. Occupational injury unbundled from a labor contract is the fastest patch: more than 22 million in the MOHRSS pilot by September 2025; Meituan says it has paid over 2 billion yuan in premiums for more than 13 million riders, at an estimated 0.06 yuan per order. Write the worker as his own boss, and the firm exits both the wage floor and the public account.
美团公布的数据显示，2024年高频骑手月收入为6,650—9,344元，2025年上半年为6,949—10,201元。约80%的美团骑手来自县域；逾九成为18—44岁的外来务工者。这些收入要用来交房租、付学费，代价则是接近全职的工作时间。此前，只有约11%的骑手达到了平台宣传中可获得保险保障的260天接单门槛；相比之下，曾至少上线一次的骑手有数百万人。武汉大学2022年的一项调查发现，约80%的配送员没有养老保险，约79%没有医疗保险。让职业伤害保障不再以劳动合同为前提，是最快补上缺口的办法：截至2025年9月，人力资源和社会保障部（MOHRSS）的试点已覆盖超过2,200万人；美团称，已为逾1,300万名骑手缴纳超过20亿元保费，按订单估算约为每单0.06元。只要把劳动者定义成“自己的老板”，企业就能同时免于承担最低工资责任和公共社保体系中的缴费责任。
Policy has turned. After 2021 multi-ministry guidance came algorithm filing, bans on the “strictest” timers, points instead of cash lateness fines, forced log-offs, and clocks that add back red-light waits. In 2025 Shanghai brokered an accord with Ele.me (later Taobao Instant Commerce) on dispatch, pricing, and windows. Meituan rolled out safety scores in about 200 cities, a reported 100-million-yuan bonus pool for not running lights, and a nationwide pension subsidy: riders hitting the local contribution floor in three of six months can receive about 50 percent of the premium. The old design was a choice, not physics. Forced rest without a higher piece rate still squeezes “work longer” into “work faster.” Injury clocks that end with the last order still drop a death in a rented room. Li and Yuan died in a year when the net was already being built. It was not fine enough for a 55-year-old who stayed alive by staying online.
不过如今政策风向已经转变。2021年多部门出台指导意见后，算法备案、禁止采用“最严”配送时限、以扣积分代替超时罚款、强制下线休息，以及将等红灯的时间加回配送时限等措施陆续推出。2025年，上海协调促成了饿了么（后更名为淘宝闪购）在派单、定价和配送时限方面的一项协议。美团在约200个城市推行安全积分机制，据报道，还设立了1亿元奖金池，奖励不闯红灯的骑手，并推出全国性养老保险补贴：骑手在六个月内有三个月收入达到当地社保缴费基数下限，即可获得约为养老保险缴费额50%的补贴。过去的系统设计，是一种选择，并非不可改变的自然法则。若不提高每单报酬，强制休息不过是把“干得更久”挤压成“干得更快”。若伤害保障的计时仍在最后一单结束时戛然而止，死在出租屋里的人依旧会被排除在外。李国才和袁某去世的那一年，这张保障网已在编织之中。可它的网眼仍然太大，兜不住那个靠一直在线才能维持生计的55岁劳动者。
#5 谁在为便利买单？
Customers pay the sticker. Platforms pay servers, subsidy wars, and public relations. Riders pay a body that depreciates and a status that writes accidents as private fate. Families pay night shifts and a settlement called mutual agreement. Cities pay the intersection and the emergency bay. Public finance pays later, when today’s missing contributions become tomorrow’s fiscal gap. Match control to duty. Make the algorithm contestable. If a safe run cannot be done in thirty minutes, thirty minutes should not be the default. “Some riders clear ten thousand a month,” without hours, casualties, and coverage, uses an average to bury a distribution.
消费者支付的是标价。平台承担的是服务器开支、补贴大战和公关费用。骑手付出的是日渐折损的身体；他们的用工身份，还让事故被写成了个人的不幸。家庭承担的是夜班带来的负担，以及一份名为“双方协商一致”的和解协议。城市承担的是交通路口的事故和急诊救治的压力。而这一切则是公共财政在日后买单——今天缺失的社保缴费，会变成明天的财政缺口。我们应该让管理控制权与责任相匹配，让劳动者有权对算法决定提出异议。如果安全送达不可能在三十分钟内完成，三十分钟就不该成为默认时限。只说“有些骑手月入过万”，却不提工时、伤亡和保障覆盖情况，只用一个平均数来掩盖整个群体内部的差异。
Who pays for the convenience? Until platforms put protection on the cost sheet, cities put rules inside the model, and customers spend a little patience, the payer does not change. The person in the weatherproof jacket is not a feature of the application. They are the price.
究竟谁在为便利买单？只要平台还没有把劳动保障计入成本，城市还没有把监管规则嵌入算法模型，消费者还不愿多付出一点耐心，买单的人就不会改变。身穿防风防雨外套的骑手，不是应用程序中的一项功能。他们本身，就是这份便利的代价。
